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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as
amended and Rule 3(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I.
Whether service of process was sufficient giving the
trial court jurisdiction to enter the default judgment. The
standard of review is whether the judge acted in accord with the
law; the judge is not allowed any discretion, and no deference is
given to the judge's ruling.

State Dept. of Social Service v.

Viiil, 784 P.2d 1130 (Utah 1989).
II.
Whether defendant adequately met its burden of proof
and persuasion in its motion to overcome the presumption of valid
jurisdiction.

The standard of review is whether the judge acted

in accord with the law; the judge is not allowed any discretion,
and no deference is given to the judge's ruling.

State Dept. of

Social Service v. Viiil. 784 P.2d 1130 (Utah 1989).
III.
Whether service of process upon Nu Skin's employee was
valid under the doctrine of apparent authority.

The standard of

review is whether the judge acted in accord with the law; the
5
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judge is not allowed any discretion, and no deference is given to
the judge's ruling.

State Dept. of Social Service v. Viiil, 784

P.2d 1130 (Utah 1989).
IV.
Whether the Judge abused his discretion in denying
counsel the opportunity to argue against the motion, in summarily
granting the motion to quash service of process, and in denying
counsel the opportunity to take discovery, including the
deposition of Rob Mullins of Nu Skin.

The standard of review is

whether the trial court judge abused his discretion.

Birch v.

Birch, 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1989); Taylor v. Estate of
Taylor, 770 P.2d 163 (Utah App. 1989).
V.
Whether the Judge abused his discretion in awarding
attorney fees in the matter.

The standard of review is whether

the trial court judge abused his discretion.

Birch v. Birch, 771

P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1989); Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d
163 (Utah App. 1989).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
Counsel believes there are no determinative
constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances or rules in this
matter.

6
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the orders of Judge Rokich of
the Third District Court of Utah, Salt Lake County, granting the
Motion of defendant-appellee Nu Skin International, Inc. ("Nu
Skin") seeking to quash service of process following entry of a
default judgment against it, and further awarding Nu Skin costs
of $1,000.00. The facts relevant to the appeal are that the
lawsuit below was filed on January 29, 1992 wherein plaintiff
sought recovery against defendant Nedra Roney (not served below)
and Nu Skin for damages resulting from claims of Defamation,
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Tortious
Interference with Advantageous Economic Relations, Services
Provided on Open Account, Collection on a Promissory Note,
various Breaches of Agreements and common law Fraud.

(See

complaint)•
In February, 1992, a copy of the summons and complaint,
together with an "Acceptance of Service" form, and a letter from
appellant's counsel was sent to Mr. Steven Lund, the registered
agent for Nu Skin, asking that he sign the Acceptance of Service
form and respond to the complaint.

(Affidavit of Jeffrey B.

Brown, paragraph 2 and copies attached thereto).

He chose not to

respond to the summons and complaint, but sent it to Nu Skin
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counsel in California.
to the complaint.

Nu Skin counsel also chose not to respond

(Affidavit of Steven J. Lund, paragraph 4).

When no response was forthcoming, on March 23, 1992, a
Utah County Deputy Sheriff traveled to the Nu Skin's headquarters
in Provo, Utah, with instructions to serve Steve Lund, the
registered agent for Nu Skin, and if he could not be found, to
otherwise comply with the provisions of Rule 4(e)(5), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.

(Affidavit of Sheriff, paragraph 4).

Upon

arriving at the Nu Skin headquarters, the Deputy was ultimately
directed to a Nu Skin employee, Rob Mullins, who expressly
represented to the Deputy that he could accept the summons and
complaint as part of his official duties. After inquiring into
his name and position, and based upon his express
representations, the Deputy served Mr. Mullins with the summons
and complaint as an agent of the corporation.

(Affidavit of

Sheriff, paragraphs 6 through 9).
On May 22, 1992, the trial court entered a default
judgment against the defendant Nu Skin International, Inc. after
it failed to appear in the action, despite being served with
legal process and despite having been sent a Notice of Intent to
Enter Default by appellants former counsel.

Thereafter, Nu Skin

filed a motion to quash service of process—claiming the person
served at Nu Skin was not authorized to accept service of process
8
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on behalf of Nu Skin—seeking to set aside the default judgment
and seeking an award of attorney fees.

Conspicuously absent from

discussion in this motion was any discussion or evidence
concerning what the Nu Skin employee did with the summons and
complaint after he received it. A hearing was held on said
motion, during which counsel was denied the opportunity to argue
against the motion, and during which the Judge denied counsel the
opportunity to take the deposition of Rob Mullins, the Nu Skin
employee served.

The motion quashing service of process was

granted by Judge Rokich, and subsequently the Judge entered an
order awarding defendant $1,000.00 in attorney fees, ostensibly
for the bad faith of counsel for appellant under Rule 11, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, in obtaining the default judgment. The
court finally ruled on all issues on August 3, 1992, and this
appeal was thereafter taken and the Notice of Appeal was filed on
September 1, 1992.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The service of process in this case was sufficient
giving the trial court jurisdiction to enter the default judgment
and service of process upon Nu Skin's employee was valid under
the doctrine of apparent authority.

Further, the defendant Nu

Skin failed to adequately meet its burden of proof and persuasion
in its motion to overcome the presumption of valid jurisdiction
9
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in having the default judgment set aside.

Further, Judge Rokich

abused his discretion in denying counsel the opportunity to argue
against the motion to set aside the default judgment, in
summarily granting the motion to quash service of process and in
denying counsel the opportunity to take discovery, including the
deposition of Rob Mullins of Nu Skin, the person upon whom
service of process was made.

Finally, Judge Rokich abused his

discretion in awarding attorney fees in the matter against
plaintiff's counsel for having the default judgment entered.
ARGUMENT
I., II. AND III.
THE DEFENDANT NU SKIN FAILED TO ADEQUATELY MEET ITS
BURDEN OF PROOF AND PERSUASION IN ITS MOTION TO
OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION OF VALID JURISDICTION IN
HAVING THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT SET ASIDE.
SERVICE OF PROCESS UPON NU SKIN'S EMPLOYEE WAS VALID
UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF APPARENT AUTHORITY.
THE SERVICE OF PROCESS IN THIS CASE WAS SUFFICIENT
GIVING THE TRIAL COURT JURISDICTION TO ENTER THE
DEFAULT JUDGMENT.
Nu Skin's sole argument for its Motion to Quash service
of process was that Rob Mullins, the person served with the
Summons and Complaint by Deputy Sheriff JoAnn Murphy of the Utah
County Sheriffs Office was not an officer, a managing or general
agent, or was not otherwise authorized to receive service of
process for Nu Skin.

However, in making this argument, Nu Skin
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did not submit an Affidavit of Rob Mullins and the trial court
refused to allow counsel for appellant to conduct any discovery
or take the deposition of Rob Mullins. According to the
Affidavit of Deputy Murphy, she traveled to Nu Skin's corporate
office in Provo, and was directed to Rob Mullins who stated that
he could accept service, that his official title was order
processor, but that he had other duties as well. After service
of the Summons and Complaint on Mr. Mullins, Nu Skin still failed
to make any response or appear in the case and default judgment
was sought.

An Affidavit of Deputy Murphy, dated May 12, 1992,

was filed with the court and a Notice of Intent to default was
sent to Nu Skin.

After reviewing the Affidavit of Deputy Murphy

and Notice of Intent, the trial court entered a default judgment
against Nu Skin for failure to appear in the action.
more than two months after service was completed.

This was

Nu Skin

attempted to make it appear as though Appellant was using games
of deceit or tricks or pulling a fast one on the court in having
the default judgment entered.

This was not the case as appellant

complied with all rules of procedure and practice in having the
default certificate and default judgment entered, and further
complied with additional requests of the trial court that a
Notice of Intent to take Default be sent and further that an

11
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Affidavit of the Deputy Sheriff be obtained explaining why she
served the person that she did serve.
Rule 4(e)(5) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(U.R.C.P.) provides that a summons and complaint may be served
upon any corporation by delivering a copy thereof to an officer,
a managing or general agent, or other agent authorized to receive
service or if no such officer can be found then upon the person
in charge of such office or place of business.
Nu Skin claimed that the responsibilities and duties of
Rob Mullins did not include acceptance of service of process. Nu
Skin further claimed that these facts were uncontroverted in the
lower court, but without basis in fact. At the trial court
level, Nu Skin artfully skirted the issue of what ultimately
happened to the summons and complaint served on Rob Mullins.

Mr.

Lund, the registered agent, merely stated that he had "never been
personally served with the Summons and Complaint in the present
action."

(Affidavit of Steven Lund, paragraphs 3 and 5.)

He

never stated that he did not receive the copy of the Summons and
Complaint that was served upon Rob Mullins.
possibility factually denied.

Nowhere is this

No Affidavit from Mr. Mullins was

ever filed with the court in support of Nu Skin's motion.

In

fact, appellant's counsel requested an opportunity to depose and
question Mr. Mullins, but was refused the opportunity to do so by
12
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the court.

Nu Skin failed to submit any affidavit or sworn

statement by Mr. Mullins concerning his duties and
responsibilities, in spite of a sworn affidavit by a Utah County
Sheriff Officer, that Mr. Mullins expressly represented to the
officer that he had authority to accept service.
Rule 4(e)(5) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(U.R.C.P.) provides that a summons and complaint may be served
upon any corporation by delivering a copy thereof to an officer,
a managing or general agent, or other agent authorized to receive
service or if no such officer can be found then upon the person
in charge of such office or place of business.

The affidavit of

Steven J. Lund does not even deny that Mr. Mullins might have
been someone "in charge of such office or place of business."

It

merely states that he "does not supervise personnel, operations,
or any other aspect of Nu Skin's business."

(Paragraph 7).

In considering motions to set aside a default judgment,
such as Nu Skin's, the issue is essentially one of jurisdiction.
Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288, 290 (Utah 1986).

Unlike motions

to vacate default judgments for other reasons, a resolution of a
motion to vacate a default judgment based upon lack of
jurisdiction is a matter of law, not discretion.

State Dept. of

Social Services v. Vinil, 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989).

13
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Further, the opposing party must overcome the presumption of
valid jurisdiction.

As the Utah Supreme Court noted in Viiil;

When a judgment, including a default judgment, has been
entered by a court of general jurisdiction, the law
presumes that jurisdiction exists, and the burden is on
the party attacking jurisdiction to prove its absence.
[Citations omitted].
Viiil, 784 P.2d at 1133.
While there appear to be no Utah cases directly on
point—i.e., concerning service of process based on the apparent
authority of a domestic corporation's employee—other
jurisdictions have ruled directly on the issue.

In those cases,

the courts have held that employees with apparent authority to
accept service of process will be deemed to have actual
authority, and the service of process will be valid.
Illustrative of that sound jurisprudential principle is
the case of Leo v. General Electric Co., Ill F.R.D. 407 (E.D.N.Y.
1986), where the court held that service upon a clerical employee
who held herself out to be authorized to accept service, was
sufficient service of process.

In Leo, the process server went

to one of G.E.'s many office and was directed by an employee in
the main lobby to call Mr. Bob Malool from the lobby phone.
Using the phone, the process server spoke with Mr. Malool's
secretary who, after meeting him in the lobby, told him she could
accept the papers.

To his question she answered affirmatively
14
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that she was authorized to accept the papers, and so he served
her.

G.E. maintained that this service was not valid; however,

the court found valid and sufficient service under the doctrine
of apparent authority.
The court held that while the secretary was not a
"managing agent" under the Rule 4(e)(3), Fed. R. Civ. P. (which
is virtually identical to the Rule 4(e)(5) U.R.C.P.), the
employee's apparent authority validated the delivery.

Where the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are substantially identical to the
Federal Rules, the court will "freely refer to authorities which
have interpreted the federal rule."

Miller v. Brocksmith, 825

P.2d 690, 693 (Utah App. 1992).
In regard to the employee's apparent authority, the
court in Leo noted:
Although the secretary was not an agent for process
under [the Rules], the service was made in a manner
which, objectively viewed, was calculated to give the
corporation fair notice of the lawsuit...When a process
server acts reasonably in serving a corporate employee
who displays apparent authority to accept such service,
the fault lies with the defendant corporation and
service will be upheld. [Emphasis added].
Leo, 111 F.R.D. at 411-412 (quoting Fashion Page Ltd. v. Zurich
Insurance Co., 50 N.Y.2d 265, 273-274, 428 N.Y.S.2d 890, 406
N.E.2d 747 (1980).

In addition, the Leo court found that the

process server acted diligently to effect service of process and
stated:
15
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...if a corporation is subject to jurisdiction, and if
the summons is effectively delivered to a servable
official, the better approach is to seek to sustain
jurisdiction rather than become bogged down in highly
cerebral distinctions between types of agents.
Leo, 111 F.R.D. at 413 (quoting N.Y. Civ. Prac. § 311, McLaughlin
Practical Commentary (McKinney 1972).

The solid rule set forth

in Fashion Page and Leo on apparent authority continue to be
followed in New York.

The court in M. Prusman, Ltd. v. Ariel

Maritime Group, Inc., 719 F.Supp. 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), stated:
Recognizing that a 'process server cannot be expected
to know the corporation's internal practices,'...valid
service [is found] where 'the process server has gone
to [the corporation's] offices, made proper inquiry of
the defendant's own employees, and delivered the
summons according to their directions.'
Prusman, at 220, quoting Fashion Page, 50 N.Y.2d 265, 406 N.E.2d
747, 751, 428 N.Y.S.2d 890, 894).
In the present case, Deputy Sheriff Murphy went to the
corporate offices of the defendant, and there was directed to the
floor of Nu Skin's corporate headquarters to effect service. At
that location, Mr. Mullins represented to the Deputy that he had
authority to accept the summons and complaint on behalf of Nu
Skin.

As in Leo, the employee expressly represented that he had

apparent authority to a process server who was acting properly
and diligently.

If Rob Mullins did not in fact have actual

authority, as Nu Skin only partially contended at the trial court
level, the fault leading to the default judgment lies with Nu
16
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Skin and its employees, and service should have been upheld by
the trial court judge as a matter of law.
The apparent authority doctrine has also been favorably
applied in other jurisdictions to support service, rather than to
defeat it on hyper-technical and strained grounds.

In Henderson

v. Cherry, Beakaert & Holland, 932 F.2d 1410 (11th Cir. 199), the
Eleventh Circuit held that service upon a non-partner employee of
an accounting firm constituted valid service of process, because
the person's "position is such as to afford reasonable assurance
that he will inform his principal that such process has been
served upon him."

Henderson, 932 F.2d at 1412 (quoting Scott v.

Atlanta Dairies Coop., 239 Ga. 721, 724, 238 S.E.2d 340, 343
(1977).

Similarly, in Merrill Chadwick Co. v. October Oil Co.,

725 P.2d 17 (Colo. 1986), the court held that the representation
by the secretary of the registered agent, that she had authority
to accept service and the fact that she did accept service, was
sufficient to uphold service.

On that basis, the court denied

the motion to set aside the default judgment.
In these cases dealing with apparent authority, courts
uphold service where, as in the instant case, it is likely that
the notice will reach and does reach the intended party.

Indeed,

in the present case, the record is factually devoid of any
evidence that the summons and complaint served on Mr. Rob Mullins
17
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did not in fact reach the intended party and Nu Skin has failed
to meet its burden of proof and persuasion on that critical
issue.
It is undisputed, however that the notice was designed
to reach Nu Skin through service by a deputy sheriff, after Nu
Skin refused to accept service of process through mail sent to
Steven Lund, the registered agent of Nu Skin.

Nu Skin knew

informally of the existence of the complaint, but chose to do
nothing in regard to it.

After service of process upon Rob

Mullins, again Nu Skin failed to take any action to protect it
from entry of a default judgment.

Only after entry of said

judgment, and prior to any action by appellant to enforce said
judgment, Nu Skin moved to set aside the default judgment.
Further support for appellant's position is found in
Jordan v. United States, 694 F.2d 833 (D.C. Circ. 1982), where,
as in our case, service was first attempted by mail.

Later, the

plaintiff's attorney invoked the process of the U.S. Marshall's
office to effect service.

The United States moved to quash

service as being deficient and not in accord with the rules. The
court held:
Where the necessary parties in the government have
actual notice of a suit, suffer no prejudice from a
technical defect in service, and there is justifiable
excuse for the failure to serve properly, courts should
not...constru[e] [the federal rules] so rigidly or...so
narrowly.
18
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Jordan, 694 F.2d at 836.
In the present case, Nu Skin received actual notice by
mail, which is admitted in the Affidavit of Steven Lund.

He

further stated that he turned the same over to Nu Skin's
attorney, who did nothing with the same.

Personal service was

subsequently made upon an employee at the corporate headquarters
of Nu Skin who expressly represented that he had authority to
accept service.

Later, a Notice of Intent to take default was

mailed to Nu Skin, and then finally, an Affidavit of the Deputy
Sheriff was obtained in order to get the court to enter the
default judgment.

Appellant complied with all of the rules of

procedure in obtaining the default.
Nu Skin's technical argument that the employee served
was "clerical" and thus could not, under Rule 4(e)(5) U.R.C.P.,
accept process, is incorrect.

While service on a "managing

agent" would undoubtedly be effective service under the rules,
the fact that an employee is not a "managing agent" does not mean
that he may not also accept service. An employee, even a
"clerical" employee, may be authorized to accept service and, as
the cases quoted abundantly demonstrated, may have apparent
authority to accept service even when he has no actual authority.
This is particularly so where the employee at corporate
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headquarters expressly represents to a diligent process server
that he is authorized to accept service.
Whether actual notice, standing alone, is sufficient to
assert jurisdiction is not the issue in this case.

This case

involves actual knowledge of the case through notification sent
through the mail, and further service of process on an employee
of defendant at the corporate headquarters after that employee
has represented to the process server that he was authorized to
accept service of process.

Further, this case includes the added

issue of what happened to the summons and complaint served upon
Rob Mullins.

The evidence presented by Nu Skin fails to negate

the possibility or even the likelihood that Mr. Mullins gave said
summons and complaint served upon him to Steven Lund or other
authorized agents of Nu Skin, and the trial court action in
refusing to allow appellant to take any discovery of Mr. Mullins
or Nu Skin denied appellant the opportunity to resolve that
issue.

Nu Skin is attempting to evade the logical result of its

own deliberate inaction.
conduct.

Courts strongly disfavor this kind of

As the Utah Court of Appeals noted in a case where the

defendant had artfully avoided service, "personal service should
not become a 'degrading game of wiles and tricks."7

Wood v.

Weening, 736 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Utah App. 1987) (quoting Business &
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Prof. Adi. Co. v. Baker, 62 Or.App. 237, 659 P.2d 1025, 1027
(1983).
Furthermore, when a judgment has been entered,
including a default judgment, this court has stated that the
burden is on the party attacking jurisdiction to prove its
absence.

State Dept. of Social Services v. Viiil, 784 P.2d 1130,

1132 (Utah 1989).
Officer Murphy.

Nu Skin failed to contradict the Affidavit of

When a law enforcement officer serves papers to

a corporate employee at corporate headquarters who has
affirmatively represented that he has authority to accept service
of process, jurisdiction is presumed, as the trial court properly
found in entering the default judgment based on Deputy Murphy's
Affidavit.

Nu Skin should have been required to come forward and

prove the absence of jurisdiction, which it failed to do. As
stated above, the Affidavit of Steven Lund, while attempting to
refute the Affidavit of Deputy Murphy, fails to do so, and Nu
Skin failed entirely to provide proof of what actually happened
to the summons and complaint that was served on Rob Mullins.
IV.
JUDGE ROKICH ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN DENYING COUNSEL
THE OPPORTUNITY TO ARGUE AGAINST THE MOTION TO SET
ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT, IN SUMMARILY GRANTING THE
MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE OF PROCESS AND IN DENYING
COUNSEL THE OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE DISCOVERY, INCLUDING
THE DEPOSITION OF ROB MULLINS OF NU SKIN, THE PERSON
UPON WHOM SERVICE OF PROCESS WAS MADE.
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At the hearing on Nu Skin's Motion to Quash Service,
the trial court refused to allow appellant's former counsel to
argue against said motion, stating words to the effect that "You
can make your argument, but I have already made my decision."
The court further summarily granted the Motion to Quash, and
finally denied former counsel for appellant any opportunity to
take discovery or a deposition of Rob Mullins in order to
ascertain what ultimately happened to the summons and complaint
that was served upon him.

At this point we still do not know

what happened to those, and the evidence provided by Nu Skin
artfully skirted that issue entirely.

If, as appellant suspects,

Rob Mullins turned said summons and complaint over to Steven Lund
or another authorized agent of Nu Skin, then appellant's argument
that the default judgment should have remained would be
drastically bolstered.

However, the trial court refused to allow

this discovery to occur and in doing so abused its discretion.
In general, under Rule 26(b)(1), U.R.C.P.:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter
involved in the pending action, whether it relates to
the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or
to the claim or defense of any other party...
Clearly, the issues relating to the service of process on Rob
Mullins, whether he has accepted service of process before or
after the service in this case, and if so, whether he was ever
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reprimanded by his employer for doing so, and what he did with
the summons and complaint served upon him in this case are
"relevant to the subject matter involved" upon which appellant
should have been allowed to take discovery.
If the deposition of Mr. Mullins revealed that he was
in charge of Nu Skin's property, operations, business activities,
office, place of business, or in some other manner responsible
for or with control over the affairs of Nu Skin, then service
would be proper under Rule 4 U.R.C.P.

Beard v. White, Green and

Addison Associates, Inc., 336 P.2d 125 (Utah 1959).

This

determination should have been made by the lower court, following
discovery relating to the same.
Furthermore, the Affidavit of Deputy Murphy states that
Rob Mullins approached her and stated that he was authorized to
accept service of process. If the deposition of Rob Mullins
revealed that he was designated by Nu Skin to accept service of
this or other lawsuits, or that he had done so in the past with
Nu Skin's knowledge, then also service would have been proper.
Rule 26(c), U.R.C.P., regarding protective orders,
states:
Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom
discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the
court in which the action is pending...may make any
order which justice requires to protect a party or
person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or
undue burden or expense...including...(1) that the
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discovery not be had...[Emphasis added; portions
omitted].
In this case, there was no motion for a protective order made by
Nu Skin concerning discovery; there was no good cause shown why
the discovery should not be allowed; nor was the discovery
anticipated such that would annoy, embarrass, oppress or subject
Nu Skin to undue burden or expense.

Indeed, there existed no

reason to deny appellant the opportunity to take discovery
concerning the service of process on Mr. Mullins.

In so denying

appellant the opportunity to take this discovery, the trial court
abused its discretion.
V.
JUDGE ROKICH ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN AWARDING ATTORNEY
FEES IN THE MATTER AGAINST PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL FOR
HAVING THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT ENTERED.
Utah Courts have consistently held that attorney's fees
may only be awarded if there is a statutory or contractual basis
for the award.

Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988

(Utah 1988); Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. V. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 965
(Utah App. 1989).

In this case, the only provision under which

attorney's fees could be awarded is set forth in U.C.A. §78-27-56
(1988), which provides in relevant part:
In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable
attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court
determines that the action or defense to the action was
without merit and not brought or asserted in good
faith.
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This statute is a codification of the interpretive rule set forth
in Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149 (Utah 1983), which requires
three elements to be met before an award may be granted:

(1)

that the party requesting the award of fees by the prevailing
party; (2) that the action or defense be without merit; and (3)
that good faith is lacking.
then no award may be granted.

If all three elements are not met,
Hermes v. Park's Sportsman, 813

P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah App. 1991).

These three elements were not

met in the present case.
While it may be presumed, for sake of argument, that Nu
Skin was the prevailing party, there is no evidence to support
the elements that plaintiff's actions were without merit and that
the plaintiff acted in bad faith.
In Cady, the Utah Supreme Court stated that "without
merit" and "frivolous" were synonymous and then defined
"frivolous" as being "of little weight or importance having no
basis in law or fact..."

Cady, 671 P.2d at 151. The court also

addressed the burden of proof for merit-less actions when it
stated that "there [must] be substantial evidence that the
[action] was lacking [a] basis in either law or fact and
therefore frivolous."

Id. at 152.

It is evident that plaintiff's actions were not without
merit.

The default judgment was entered against Nu Skin in
25
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compliance with all rules of procedure and rules of practice.
The plaintiff had an absolute right to obtain a default against a
non-responsive party.

Thus, not only has there been no showing

of "substantial evidence," there has been no evidence of a meritless action.

The second element under Cady was not and cannot be

met.
Additionally, the third element of bad faith is also
lacking.

The trial court made a finding of bad faith on the part

of plaintiff's counsel premised on the fact that plaintiff did
not inform the trial court of the status of Mr. Shuff s [later]
claimed representation of Nu Skin and on the fact that plaintiff
failed to notify Mr. Shuff of the notice of intent to take
default.

However, this is not a basis for a finding of bad

faith.
Rule 55, U.R.C.P. does not require that any such notice
be given.

It states:

...[I]t shall not be necessary to give such party in
default any notice of action taken or to be taken or to
serve any notice or paper otherwise required by these
rules to be served on a party to the action or
proceeding.
This language is clear and unambiguous.

A plaintiff is not

required to give any notice to a party in default nor to their
attorney.
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Most importantly, the Utah Supreme Court has squarely
ruled that opposing counsel need not be notified prior to taking
a default judgment, despite the fact that counsel for both sides
had been discussing the very matter in litigation prior to
obtaining the default.

In Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Jensen,

656 P.2d 1009 (Utah 1982), the plaintiffs filed a complaint on
October 23, seeking a judgment for the unpaid balance of the
defendants' Master Charge account.

A summons ^nd complaint was

mailed to the defendants (pursuant to an order granting
alternative service) on October 24, but defendants did not
respond.

On November 5, the defendants' attorney Mr. Schwobe

spoke with plaintiff's attorney over the phone.

The next day Mr.

Schwobe requested copies of the pleadings in a letter to Mr.
Young.

Mr. Young refused to supply the documents in a letter

dated November 14 unless Mr. Schwobe agreed to appear generally
in the matter.

Mr. Schwobe did not respond nor did he enter a

general appearance, apparently in the belief that service of
process was deficient.
On December 4, a default judgment was entered against
the defendants without any notice regarding the default or any
other matter being mailed to or discussed with defendants or
their counsel with whom Mr. Young had been actively discussing
the case.

On December 8, Mr. Schwobe again requested copies of
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the pleadings, and on December 31, a copy of the summons and
complaint was served upon the defendants at their new address.
On January 22 Mr. Schwobe served an answer and counterclaim on
Mr. Young, but the answer was returned for failure to attach the
counterclaim filing fee.

On March 5 defendants answer and

counterclaim was filed, and on March 11, plaintiff filed a motion
to strike the same on the basis of the default judgment.

On

March 17, defendants filed a motion to set aside the default
judgment alleging defective process and inadequate notice of the
default judgment.
To the defendants7 contentions in Central Bank that
ongoing communications between the attorneys created an
obligation to notify opposing counsel of the default, the Utah
Supreme Court held that under the clear language of Rule 5, 55
and 77, U.R.C.P., "plaintiff was under no duty to notify
defendants of the default."

Id. at 1011. The Supreme Court in a

unanimous decision further stated:
We are satisfied that defendants had actual notice of
the suit filed against them. Indeed, that fact has
never been denied or controverted. The defendants
knowingly shirked their duty to respond, and they have
no valid basis for setting the default aside.
Id. at 1012.
In the present case, there is no dispute that Nu Skin
had actual notice of the suit.

As the trial court was advised on
28
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July 21, 1992, plaintiff wanted to further develop the facts
surrounding Nu Skin's receipt of the notice of intent to take
default, and of the service of the summons and complaint on Rob
Mullins.

For this purpose, plaintiff requested that he be

permitted to depose certain Nu Skin employees.

This request was

denied in a telephone conference between the parties and the
trial court on July 21, 1992.
The court in Central Bank further found that
plaintiff's actions "did nothing to lull the defendants into a
false sense of security that would justify them in not taking any
further action."
The Central Bank case and the present case have a lot
of similarities.

However, in the present case, the discussions

between counsel did not even involve the case in which the
default judgment was taken, but rather involved a case pending in
California and likewise did nothing to lull the defendants into a
false sense of security.
3 through 5).

(Affidavit of Jeffrey Brown, paragraphs

Further, the Notice of Intent to take Default was

sent to Nu Skin International, Inc., c/o Rob Mullins, because
counsel believed that was the proper thing to do.

It was not

sent to Mr. Shuff because it was believed that he would not be
involved in the Utah case until and unless plaintiff dismissed
his appeal of the California lawsuit.

(Affidavit of Jeffrey B.
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Brown, paragraph 5).

Indeed, counsel complied with Rule 5(b) in

mailing the Notice of Intent to take Default directly to Nu Skin,
particularly where no counsel had entered an appearance.
Apparently the trial court, in its Memorandum Decision dated
August 3, 1992, based the award of the attorney fees upon the
condition imposed by the court "as a condition to entry of
Judgment that notice of intent to take a default judgment be
given to a proper party."

Apparently, while not specifically

stated, the court believed that notice given directly to Nu Skin,
c/o Rob Mullins, the person who had been served on behalf of Nu
Skin, was not adequate in the court's mind.

However, counsel for

plaintiff was left at the time with no specific directions as to
what was a proper notice, and was penalized later when the trial
court unilaterally decided that the notice was improper.
CONCLUSION
The default judgment was properly entered against Nu
Skin International, Inc. for its failure to timely respond to the
summons and complaint properly served upon its employee at its
corporate headquarter who affirmatively represented to the
process server that he was authorized to accept service of
process.

It was an abuse of discretion for the trial court

judgment to summarily quash service of process, to deny counsel
the opportunity to argue against the motion, to deny appellant
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the opportunity to take discovery on the issues surrounding the
service of process and notice of intent to take default, and it
was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to award attorney
fees against plaintiff under the circumstances.

The matter

should be remanded with directions to the trial court to
reinstate the default judgment, and to award no attorney fees to
Nu Skin.
DATED this

day of February, 1993.
BROWN & BROWN

Jeffrey B. Brown, Esq.
Budge W. Call, Esq.
Attorneys for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

day of February,

1993, I caused to be mailed, first class postage prepaid, four
true and correct copies of the foregoing to each party separately
represented in care of the following:
John D. Shuff, Esq.
ROBINS, KAPLAN, MILLER & CIRESI
444 Market Street, Suite 2700
San Francisco, California 94109
Michael D. Smith, Esq.
NU SKIN INTERNATIONAL, INC.
75 West Center Street
Provo, Utah 84601

3 511brinuski.bro
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